Despite considerable protections provided by the patent system, a surprisingly small number of firms use patents. This study focuses on examining empirically Henry and Ponce (2011)'s theoretical finding that firms' preference of secrecy over patents rise with knowledge tradeability using the Innovation in Australian Business survey data. Besides, other determinants of firms' choices of patenting versus secrecy are explored. We constructed a trivariate probit model to correct for the endogeneity of the key explanatory dummy variable in the basic bivariate probit model of patents and secrecy. As robustness check, we attempted to correct for the potential sample selection bias caused by using only the innovator subsample. Our key findings are that firms engaged in knowledge trading or those among the largest R&D investors, are more likely to use secrecy than patents. Other findings are consistent with the existing literature, which are large or manufacturing firms and those involving R&D joint-ventures are more likely to use patents, while firms obtaining information from internal and non-market sources are more inclined to use secrecy. * We would like to particularly thank Denzil Fiebig, Kevin Fox and Arghya Ghosh for their comments and suggestions. Errors and omissions are our own.
Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPR), particularly patents, play an important role to secure firms' return to innovation and offer incentives to innovate. However, there is a surprisingly low proportion of firms using patents compared to firms using secrecy in many countries. This brings into question the driving force behind the choice of patenting verses secrecy (or between the formal and informal intellectual property (IP) protections). More broadly, the current debate surrounding IPR does not only question the use of patents, but also its very existence and has been particularly well encapsulated by the following quote from Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) : "Are there natural market forces that protect inventors so that formal protections or other incentives are not necessary?".
In a recent study, Henry and Ponce (2011) construct a theoretical model to address the question posed by Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) and find that allowing for the possibility of knowledge to be traded may mitigate the need for patent protection. Their study does not claim that IPR protection is welfare weakening and that it should be eliminated but that there is a market-based mechanism, which can provide the innovator with similar innovation incentives as patent protection. In a nutshell, they show that when knowledge is tradeable, competitors wait before entering the market in the hope that the price of knowledge will decrease, and thereby provide the innovator with a temporary monopoly for a random period of time.
An important implication of their model is that the more tradeable knowledge is, holding the patent term life constant, the more likely firms are to rely on secrecy rather than patents.
The authors argue that this provides a novel explanation for the fact that, based on business surveys, firms use secrecy significantly more than patenting to protect their innovations.
The focus of this chapter is to test empirically this implication of Henry and Ponce (2011) .
Specifically, we investigate the impact of the use of licensing contracts on a firm's choice of IP protection strategy (patent or secrecy). Furthermore, our empirical model enables us to check a number of other results, which have been previously highlighted in the literature as determinants for the use of patents versus secrecy.
To undertake this analysis, we use the results of the Innovation in Australian Business survey Hall, Helmers, Rogers and Sena (2012b) report that 1.7 per cent of all registered firms in the UK patent and around 4 per cent of firms engaged in R&D have applied for a UK or European patent. By contrast, the share of secrecy users based on the IAB is 16.7 per cent for all firms and 29.5 per cent for innovators. 1 This, again, is consistent with survey evidence from the US and Europe, which consistently show that firms rate secrecy higher than patent as an IP protection instrument (see for instance Cohen et al. (2000) for the US and Arundel (2001) for Europe).
The IAB also provides data on whether a firm is engaged in licensing agreements or not. We interpret this variable as a proxy for being involved in knowledge trading. This enables us to study empirically the relationship between the use of patents and secrecy as IP protection instruments on the one hand and the use of licensing (i.e. trading knowledge) on the other hand.
Of course, the variables of interest are subject to firms' endogenous choices. A firm's decisions to protect its inventions through patents or secrecy and to sign a licensing agreement are far from random. Firstly, in theory, only innovators face this type of decisions. For this reason, we restrict the sample we use to firms, which report having introduced an innovation between 2001 and 2003 . Secondly, the use of IP protection mechanisms, in particular patents and secrecy, appear to be correlated with each other. Either firms have propensities of using some kinds of protection, formal or informal or they do not use any protection at all (see for instance Hall et al. (2012b) ). Following Pajak (2010) , we use a bivariate probit model to address the likely dependence between the choices of using patents and secrecy. Thirdly, we suspect that the licensing variable is endogenous to the choice of using an IP instrument, in particular patent, since firms with similar characteristics and motives should patent and license by definition. According to Knapp and Seaks (1998) based on Maddala (1983) , the potential endogeneity of a dummy variable in a probit model can be corrected using a recursive structure where the primary equation explains the variable of interest (i.e. Patent or Secrecy) and the second reduced form equation explains the endogenous binary variable (i.e. Licensing). Further, Maddala (1983) showed that estimates of this model can be found by a bivariate probit regression. Building on this approach, we construct a trivariate probit model where patent, secrecy and licensing are our three dependent variables.
Our estimation results show that licensing is positively associated with IP protection of any kind -patents or secrecy -but also with a relatively strong preference for secrecy over patents.
This agrees with Henry and Ponce (2011) 's theoretical prediction that the more knowledge is tradeable, the more firms use secrecy over patent because they benefit from a non legal period of temporary monopoly. In addition, our empirical model also indicates that the largest investors in R&D are more likely to use secrecy than patent. Moreover, we also find that patent users are more likely to employ a large personnel, to generate a large turnover, to introduce new products and to be in manufacturing industries. By contrast, secrecy users tend to be smaller firms in non manufacturing industries and more likely to create new processes as well as new products. Finally, firms that obtain their information from internal and non-market sources are more inclined to use secrecy, while firms that share their knowledge through R&D joint-venture are more likely to be patentees.
In terms of the methodology, we acknowledge that by selecting innovators as our sample we might have potentially introduced a sample selection bias in our estimation results. To check whether there is a sample selection problem, we applied the corrective method for sample selection to a probit model (Van de Ven and van Praag, 1981) . This model enables to estimate the likelihood of using patent or secrecy taking into account the selection mechanism behind the innovation outcome. This robustness check shows that a bias exists, however, once correcting for it, our main qualitative results continue to hold.
In summary, the contribution of this study is three-fold. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the impact of licensing on the choice of patenting versus secrecy, and more specifically to test the new theory of Henry and Ponce (2011) . Second, we are unaware of any studies in the patent literature that have corrected for the endogeneity of a dummy variable in a (bivariate) probit model. It is also relatively common practice in the literature to use a sub-sample of innovators to study the determinants of patenting and secrecy (see for instance Hall et al. (2012b) , Pajak (2010) and Arundel (2001) ). However, we have not encountered any studies correcting for the potential sample selection bias arising from this approach. Third, it is also the first time that the choice of patents versus secrecy is studied empirically using Australian data from the IAB survey.
This study is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the existing literature and the theoretical model of Henry and Ponce (2011) . Section 3 presents our empirical modelling approach. Section 4 describes the dataset and the variables selected for the analysis. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 checks for the sample selection bias and Section 7 concludes.
Background
Our paper relates to the very extensive literature on firm's choices between formal and informal IPR protection methods. Here we provide a summary of this literature before exposing in more detail the model of Henry and Ponce (2011) . For a comprehensive review, one can refer to the excellent survey by Hall, Helmers, Rogers and Sena (2012a) .
The empirical evidence based on surveys from many countries show that on average, patents are not the most important mechanism of IP appropriation while secrecy and lead time are.
The seminal studies in this area are those from Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) , which report that US managers rank patents below secrecy as an appropriation method for both product and process innovations, except in a couple of industries which specializes in "discrete" products such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Similar research conducted for instance by Arundel (2001) in Europe confirms these findings. Furthermore, recent studies based on patent and census data find that very few firms own a patent. For instance , Hall et al. (2012b) find that only 1.7% of all registered firms in the UK patented between 1998 and 2006. Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) report similar findings for the US where only 5.5 % of the manufacturing firms own a patent.
The existing theoretical literature has identified and analyzed a wide range of factors that could explain the decision to use patents or secrecy. Much of the theory relies on the premise that there is a clear trade off between the disclosure requirement imposed by a patenting system and the non disclosure permitted by secrecy and therefore assumes that patents and secrecy are mutually exclusive. In the early literature, for instance in Friedman and Posner (1991) , the choice is explained by the benefits and costs of using patents relative to relying on secrecy. These benefits and costs are mainly a function of the nature of the innovation that qualifies for protection and of strategic considerations based on the firm's competitive environment.
For instance, a key issue is whether the invention is easy to reverse engineer. If it is the case, then patent protection may be preferred because secrecy cannot prevent imitation. This latter theoretical argument can explain why empirical studies find that usually the use of patents is more associated with product, in particular 'discrete' product innovation, than with process innovation and inversely for secrecy.
Furthermore, while the early literature rests on the assumption that a patent ensures protection with certainty, this is not always the case. 2 Based on this observation, some theoretical models rely on a probabilistic view of patent rights (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005) . 3 Introducing this assumption, it has been shown in particular that the size of an innovation may be an important determinant of the choice between patents and secrecy. For instance, Anton and Yao (2004) propose a model of duopoly competition with asymmetric information -the inventor has the best knowledge of the value of the invention while its rival learns about it either through the disclosure from a patent or once it is on the market -and imperfect IP protection. In this setting, the innovator invests in R&D in order to reduce the cost of a process. She then chooses the amount of disclosure as well as whether to protect the innovation with a patent or trade secret. The model predicts that under these assumptions the amount of information disclosed by a firm may be decreasing in the value of its innovation, mesured in terms of the cost reduction assocaited with the innovation. In particular, only small and medium innovation may be patented while large inventions are mainly protected through secrecy. The intuition is that in a weak IPR protection environment, the value of the disclosure (e.g through obtaining a patent and/or a licensing agreement) is offset by the increased imitation. This theory has been tested by Pajak (2010) . Using data from the Another important issue is the state of competition. For instance, when there is strong product competition and the risk of simultaneous invention, Kultti et al. (2007) show that patenting is the only choice in equilibrium. If the firm chooses secrecy, there is a risk that the competitor wins the patent and since the patentee always earns higher profits, the incentive to patent dominates the incentive to use secrecy. On the other hand, Zaby (2010) , using an asymmetric duopoly model where one firm has a relatively large technological lead over its competitor but that competitor has the capability of making a closely related invention, shows that the leader may prefer to use secrecy rather than patent. In this particular environment, while a patent provides protection for the invention, it also requires the disclosure of this same invention which may result in the innovator losing the lead. In Heger and Zaby (2010) , the authors verify empirically their theory using the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) i.e. the German contribution to the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for 2005. They find that the patenting behaviour of a firm is negatively influenced by the technological lead of the innovator as predicted by the theory. However the result is not statistically significant. This can be explained by the fact that their initial analysis does not separate the effect of products easy to reverse engineer. Introducing an interaction term between technological lead and easiness of reverse engineering, they claim that a firm's propensity to patent increases in its technological lead in industries in which reverse engineering is easy, which, they allege, confirms their theory.
Finally, both the theoretical and empirical literature indicate that the decision to patent may be guided by other strategic motives such as earning licensing revenue, accumulating bargaining chips in negotiations (e.g cross-licensing negotiations) and building a defensive strategy to prevent lawsuits. In general, large firms are the most sensitive to these strategic issues. Further, as discussed by Arundel (2001) , smaller firms, in particular in new technology sectors, may also use patents for strategic ends to signal their expertise, to capitalize intangible assets and to attract investment. However, small firms tend to be financially constrained and more sensitive to the various costs of the patent system, in particular the cost of a patent application and the cost of protecting their patents from infringement. This is in fact the most likely explanation that Arundel (2001) offers for the key empirical finding that patenting propensity rises with firm size (or equivalently that secrecy propensity decreases with firm size), other things equal.
Henry and Ponce (2011)'s model and predictions
The economic justification for intellectual property rights protection is based on the non-rival nature of knowledge. That is, innovation can be easily copied, so that inventors cannot appropriate the rewards from their IP and would have no incentive to innovate if left to market forces only. One direct implication of this theory is that unless knowledge is protected by a patent for instance, it is impossible for the creator of this knowledge to sell it without being immediately expropriated. Henry and Ponce (2011) challenge these premises by constructing a dynamic model in which an inventor has developed an innovation that is not legally protected and potential imitators have the choice between buying the invention from the innovator or imitating the innovation at a cost. In equilibrium, the imitators choose to buy the knowledge rather than copying it and the inventor optimally chooses to sell knowledge through contracts that allow subsequent reselling by the buyers. Consequently, the first imitator competes with the inventor in the market for knowledge to sell it to the other imitators, which has the potential to drive the price of knowledge to zero. However, Henry and Ponce (2011) show that the imitator has an incentive to delay its entry in the market in the hope that other firms will buy the knowledge before them and drive its price down. As a result, the innovator enjoys a temporary monopoly without the recourse to formal IP protection. Furthermore, Henry and Ponce (2011) show that their model implies that the more tradeable is knowledge, the higher is the expected innovator's return from secrecy relatively to patenting. Their framework can be presented are as follows.
When knowledge is not tradeable, the pay off of the inventor under secrecy is given by π n+1 , which is the equilibrium discounted profit when n imitators have entered the market and the innovation is immediately imitated at time t = 0. This is the equilibrium according to the conventional theory justifying the need for legal IPR protection.
When knowledge is tradeable, the expected pay off of the inventor under secrecy based on Henry and Ponce (2011)'s model becomes:
M onopoly prof it f or random time
where π 1 denotes the profit if no imitators enter the market (i.e. the monopoly profit), and µ(k, c), the 'natural' expected duration of monopoly due to the delayed entry of imitators as a function of k, the price of knowledge in equilibrium and c, the cost of transferring knowledge incurred by the seller.
The expected pay off of the inventor if he chooses legal protection is given by:
where ν(T ), the expected duration of monopoly due to patent protection is a function of T , the finite length of the patent, and P denotes the cost of patenting.
Comparing π n+1 and V ip , Henry and Ponce (2011) point out that when knowledge is not tradeable, secrecy is preferred to patenting only if the length of patent does not cover its costs.
Comparing V is and V ip , they also note that when knowledge is tradeable, whether secrecy or patenting is chosen, the pay offs follow a similar pattern; the innovator enjoys monopoly profits for some time until all the imitators enter the market. But more importantly, in this case, the patent needs to be much longer since under secrecy the inventor enjoys monopoly profit for a random period of time. In other words, because firms can now reap the profits from delayed entry of imitators, the length of patent protection has to increase to outweigh the additional opportunity cost of choosing patents versus secrecy.
Henry and Ponce (2011) also point to some empirical evidence of their theory. Based on a number of studies using data from the 1980s and 1990s, they observe that the use of secrecy has been growing between 1983 and 1994, while the number of licensing deals that they assume to be positively correlated with knowledge trading, have also increased in the 1990s (see Levin et al. (1987) , Cohen et al. (2000) and Arundel (2001)). 3 Empirical model
Modelling the choice of IPR protection method: A bivariate probit model
Our first task is to model a firm's choice between patents and secrecy. We start by considering an innovator who chooses between patenting denoted by P and secrecy denoted by S in order to maximize its profit function: π(P, S, Z, θ), where Z is a vector of observable factors that influence profits and θ represents a vector of factors that are known by the innovator but are not measured by the available data. The solution to the profit maximization problem includes reduced forms for the choice of patenting and secrecy such that:
where X denotes a vector of exogenous factors that affect the choice of patenting or secrecy and the profit function. Note that although many of the theoretical models assume that patents and secrecy are mutually exclusive, in reality, they are not. For instance, a firm can use secrecy to protect an invention during the development phase and then rely on patents when the product is on the market. Firms can also use secrecy for some of their innovations and patents for others. This suggests that the choices of patenting or secrecy may not be independent and that there are probably common unobservables (i.e. included in θ) explaining both choices.
This simple theoretical framework can be translated into the following econometric model.
Consider a firm i and two latent variables y * pi and y * si , where p stands for patenting and s stands for secrecy. The empirical specification of the equations (3) and (4) is given by:
where the realization of the latent variable y * ji is defined by y ji = 1 if y * ji > 0 and y ji = 0 otherwise. x ji are vectors of control variables explaining the use of patenting or secrecy and the error terms u pi and u si are assumed to be bivariate normal with: var(ε ji ) = 1 and
Under these assumptions, equation (5) specifies a bivariate probit model. Note that this type of model collapses to two separate probit models if ρ = 0 but allows for correlation between the unobserved determinants of using patents and secrecy if ρ = 0.
Introducing a proxy for knowledge trading : A trivariate probit model
Since our objective is to measure the impact of knowledge trading on the choice of patenting versus secrecy, we would like to include a proxy for knowledge trading in our model. Following Henry and Ponce (2011), we assume that the volume of trade in knowledge and licensing activities undertaken by firms are positively correlated. Thus we introduce a dummy variable representing a firm's licensing choice denoted by Licensing i in the right hand side of equation (5), so that our model becomes:
As noted by Maddala (1983) , for such a model to give consistent estimates of the parameters in the equations, all the variables on the right hand side have to be exogenous. However, given the close association between protecting and trading knowledge, we suspect that the choices of IP protection methods and of entering into a licensing agreement are determined by a number of common variables. In particular, it is likely that some unobserved factors such as the strategic motives of the firm's management or the characteristics of the innovation technology, influence both choices simultaneously, in which case the exogeneity condition for our main regressor of interest, the variable Licensing, would be violated. Fortunately, Maddala
(1983) provides a relatively simple procedure to obtain consistent estimates if Licensing was to be an endogenous variable.
Consider a latent variable Licensing * i defined as follows:
where Licensing i = 1 if Licensing * i > 0 and Licensing i = 0 otherwise, u i is N (0, 1) and w i are vectors of variables affecting the decision to license.
Note that each of the probit models given by (6), forms a two equation recursive probit model with this second reduced equation (7). Maddala (1983) observes that if the errors ε ji and u i are not correlated (i.e. Licensing i is exogenous), the equations of this system can be estimated separately using a simple probit model. On the other hand, if ji and u i are correlated (i.e. Licensing i is endogenous), the separate probit method does not give consistent estimates. Furthermore, Maddala (1983) shows that consistent estimates of such a recursive probit model can be found by bivariate probit (see Knapp and Seaks (1998) for further details and an example).
Therefore, in order to address the possible endogeneity of the licensing variable, we apply Maddala (1983) 's approach to our initial bivariate probit model. We construct a trivariate probit model using the two equations specified by (6) and equation (7). A simple formation of this trivariate probit model is given by:
The errors (ε pi , ε si , u i ) are trivariate normal such that:
Note that this kind of model can be identified solely on functional forms due to the non linearity of the probit model, however it may be fragile. It is recommended to have at least one variable appearing in w i but not in x i which, in our case, amounts to choosing an instrumental variable for Licensing i (Wilde, 2000) . Selection of an appropriate instrument and other control variables for the model is discussed in the section below.
Data

Sample
The data set used in our analysis comes from a business survey conducted by the Australian The survey uses a stratified sample of 4,463 firms with more than five employees operating in Australia. One of the main advantages of the survey is the availability of information on innovation output i.e. firms are asked whether they introduced any new or significantly improved products or processes during the period covered by the survey. The 2,053 firms reporting to be innovative in this manner constitute our core sample. A breakdown of the sample by firm size and industry sector as given by the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) is provided in the Appendix. The population shares have been produced using sampling weights to take into account the stratified nature of the sample.
Using the innovators as our main sample enables us to focus our analysis on the group of firms facing the same decision to protect their IP, conditional on a range of observed characteristics.
However by selecting this sub-sample we are aware that we may be facing a sample selection problem. This potential issue is addressed in the robustness check section.
Key variables of interest and descriptive statistics
The IAB survey collects detailed information on firm general characteristics and their innovative activities and behaviours. Most variables are binary variables. In particular, firms are asked whether they use any of six IP protection methods -three formal methods including patents (Patent), registration of design (Registration) and copyright or trademarks (Copyright), and three informal methods including secrecy (Secrecy), complexity of product design (Complexity) and making frequent and rapid changes to the goods or services (Changes).
Due to the binary character of the data on protection methods, we interpret the frequency of the use of a method in the sample as the firms' propensity to use this method. Table 1 gives the frequency with which each IP protection method is used depending on if the innovation is a product or a process. We note that secrecy is the first method of protection, while patenting is the fourth out of the six methods. This ranking does not appear to change by type of innovation. However, the increase in the percentage of product innovators using patents versus secrecy is larger than for process innovators (i.e. 23% verse 7%), which suggests that product innovators may be more likely to use patents than secrecy compared to process innovators. To shed some light on the characteristics of the firms using patents and secrecy, Table 2 reports the frequencies of patenting and secrecy by firm size and in different industries. We also calculate the patent-to-secrecy ratio defined as P atent patent+Secrecy , where patent and secrecy are the frequencies of use of the protection instruments in the sample. Table 2 shows that both frequencies of patenting and secrecy increase with firm size. The patent-to-secrecy ratio also suggests that secrecy is used more frequently by firms of all sizes (i.e. ratio is less than half) but that the use of patenting tends to increase as firms grow (i.e. the patent-to-secrecy ratio increases with the number of employees).
Firms in all industries also appear to prefer secrecy to patents (i.e the share of secrecy users is larger than the share of patent users and the patent to secrecy ratio is less than 0.5 for all industries). However the patent-to-secrecy ratio indicates that patenting is relatively more frequent in manufacturing, mining and communication services. Table 3 presents the pairwise correlations between the different IP protection instruments and licensing. The table reveals that all the various IP protection methods are positively correlated with each other. In particular, as expected secrecy and patenting presents a correlation of 0.14, which confirms that using a bivariate probit model is justified (i.e. the dependence between secrecy and patenting threatens the validity of two separate probit models).
Interestingly, we note that the correlations between the Licensing variable and formal IPR protection methods seem to be relatively weak. This suggests that firms do not interpret licensing in the legal sense of the term -an agreement to use IP rights -but probably more in its knowledge trading sense. The Licensing variable also appears to be more positively correlated to Secrecy (0.16) than to Patent (0.08). These pairwise relationships, of course, have to be investigated further controlling for other explanatory variables.
Selection of control variables and instrument
Besides our two dependent variables -patent and secrecy -and our main independent variable of interest -licensing, we also select a number of control variables. Table 4 provides a brief description of all the variables to be used in the estimation. Based on the literature and in particular on Arundel (2001) , we have identified four groups of other factors influencing the choice of patents versus secrecy: 1) the firm's own innovation strategies; 2) firm size 3) the different types of information sources used to innovate and 4) the firm's sector of activity.
Two measures of innovation strategies are included in the models. First, an important characteristic of a firm's innovation strategy is whether they create new products or new processes.
As showed by Table 1, this strategy seems to have an influence on the choice between patenting and secrecy. Therefore we include two dummy variables indicating the type of innovation (product or process innovation) introduced by the firm. Second, the amount of R&D expenditures is likely to influence positively the size of an innovation, which based for instance on Anton and Yao (2004) , should also affect the choice of patenting versus secrecy. In particular, we construct a dummy for the top five percentile of firms engaged in R&D (RDtop) to analyze whether firms which are the most likely to develop large innovations tend to prefer patenting or secrecy. Table 2 clearly shows that as the number of employees increases, the patent-to-secrecy ratio tends to increase, indicating that there may be a strong relationship between the size of a firm and its preferred method of IPR protection. To control for firm size, our models contain two variables Large and Medium, which refers to the number of employees. Further, we include a variable measuring a firm's income range (Income) as an additional control for size but also as an indicator of a firm's financial resources -the lack of sufficient financial reserves to use the patent system and protect patents from infringement being often cited as a reason explaining the low proportion of patenting firms in the population of registered companies.
As noted by Arundel (2001) , firms that use external sources that require extensive sharing of information may be more inclined to use patents. This is the case for instance when joint research and development takes place. On the other hand, firms using primarily internal or institutional sources of information by opposition to market sources could give greater importance to secrecy. The IAB contains data on both cooperative R&D undertaken (JointRD) and sources of information used by firms to develop their innovation (SOI internal and SOI institutional). Three dummy variables are included in the models using this information.
Finally, empirical studies of the relative importance of patents and secrecy for firms have shown that there are large differences in the effectiveness of patents by sector of activity, with patents most useful in sectors where products are expensive to develop but relatively cheap to copy such as chemicals or mechanical equipment (see for instance Levin et al. (1987 ), Cohen et al. (2000 and more recently Arora et al. (2008) ). Our own descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 above confirm that patenting is most used in manufacturing. Therefore, we include industry sector dummies in our regression models. We note however that the industry grouping provided by the IAB is relatively unhelpful for our purpose. Specifically it does not break up the manufacturing sector into finer sub-sectors. It also does not enable grouping of the sectors according to technological content or opportunities, which according to e.g. Arundel In addition to these control variables, we have also tried to identify a valid instrument for the licensing variable. We found that firms which are driven by establishing new markets or exporting to develop new products or processes are more likely to be engaged in licensing agreements. On the other hand, this variable does not have a significant partial effect on our two dependent variables, patent and secrecy. The fact that the exporting variable has a statistically significant effect on licensing appears to be reasonably intuitive since licensing is often used in association with exporting overseas either to affiliates or non affiliates. Furthermore, we can think of a number of reasons why exporting is exogenous to the patent and secrecy variables, ceteris paribus. Firstly, the question in the IAB survey implies that the decision to export pre-dates the decision to innovate and hence to use some kind of IP protection (i.e. exporting is one of the choices in a multiple choice question asking "what reasons drive the business to innovate?"). Secondly, the sector of activity the firm is in usually pre-determines whether a firm can export or not. For instance, Hall et al. (2012b) find that the exporting firms are significantly more likely to use patents, but only when sector dummies are excluded from the regression. The relationship becomes insignificant as soon as the sector dummies are included. Thirdly, firms usually apply for patents in the US or in Europe, so that their innovation is protected in markets overseas as well as locally. Therefore, in most cases, exporting does not require additional protection. For all these reasons, we believe the variable "exporting as a business driver" (BDEX) can serve as a valid instrument in the licensing equation of our trivariate probit model.
Estimation Results
The trivariate probit model; the preferred model
Estimation results for our bivariate and trivariate probit models are reported in Table 5 Finally, we note that the coefficient estimate for the instrumental variable BDEX in the licensing equation is statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that BDEX is a relevant variable.
Firms engaged in licensing contracts are more likely to use secrecy than patents
We then compare our coefficient estimates in the bivariate and the trivariate models for our main variable of interest, Licensing. We find that the signs and the statistical significance of the coefficients are the same in both models; it is positive but statistically insignificant at the 10% level for the Patent equation and positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the Secrecy equation. However, coefficients increase in the trivariate model compared to the bivariate model due to the negative bias resulting from the endogeneity of the Licensing variable in the bivariate model.
To gain further insights into the magnitude of these effects, the average partial effects (APE) of the Licensing variable on the probability of the use of patents and secrecy have been computed in Table 6 .
Based on the trivariate model, while firms engaged in licensing agreements have an increased probability of 2.2% to use patents, they have an increased probability of 29.1% to use secrecy.
In other words, firms using licensing are over thirteen times more likely to use secrecy than Note: Numbers reported in the bracket are standard errors; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
patents. 6 Note: Numbers reported in the bracket are standard errors; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
The first implication of these results is that firms engaged in licensing are more likely to use some IP protection method -patents or secrecy. This finding is consistent with the traditional view that knowledge is non rival, so that by entering into licensing agreements, firms could easily have their innovations expropriated and hence they will seek to protect their IP.
More counterintuitive is the fact that licensing firms appear to use secrecy more than patents.
Intuitively, we expect that firms sharing their IP with rivals would tend to use patents more than secrecy, especially when knowledge sharing is done through licensing, whose legal definition is an agreement to use IP rights. This result first confirms what we suspected from the pairwise correlation analysis (see Table 3 ), that is firms do not just interpret licensing in its legal perspective, but more broadly in its knowledge trading perspective. Further, it suggests that companies do not find patents useful and prefer secrecy when they trade knowledge.
Hence, our result provides support for the theory of Henry and Ponce (2011) , which predicts that the more knowledge is tradeable, the more firms prefer to use secrecy over patents because knowledge trading provides some temporary non legal protection, which makes patenting superfluous.
This result is so striking that we investigated whether it holds for formal versus informal IP protection. We estimated the same bivariate and trivariate probit models using Formal Protection (including patents, copyrights and trademarks, registration of design and other increased probability of 1% to use patents and 3.3% to use secrecy, so that they are about 3 times more likely to use secrecy than patents.
formal methods) and Informal Protection (including secrecy, complexity of product design, making frequent and rapid changes goods and services and other informal methods) as our two dependent variables. The estimation results are presented in Table 10 in the Appendix and show that firms involved in licensing are significantly more likely to use both formal and informal protection.
The computation of the APE in Table 7 below reveals that the increased probability to use informal protection is higher than to use formal protection but to a lesser extent than previously. This change in the magnitude of the effects can be explained by the fact that licensing firms appear to use other formal methods of IP protection such as copyright and trademarks more than patents (see for instance as evidence in Table 3 the higher pairwise correlation between copyright and licensing than between patent and licensing). Exploring the reasons for this finding is an avenue for further research and requires different data that contain richer qualitative information for different types of IP protection. Note: Numbers reported in the bracket are standard errors; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Interestingly, even this latter result can be reconciled with the theory of Henry and Ponce (2011) . They indeed predict that the random duration of the temporary monopoly obtained by firms using secrecy increases in the imitation cost of the innovation. We note that copyright, trademarks and registration of design provide longer protection for the innovator than patents and that these formal IP methods are used to protect tangible representations of ideas, which are relatively easy to copy. 7 Hence, based on the theory, it is not surprising that the use of formal protection versus informal protection increases compared to the use of patents versus secrecy when knowledge is traded -on the one hand, the duration of legal protection of other formal protection is longer than for patents and on the other hand, the length of the temporary monopoly stemming from informal protection is shorter. As a result, the benefit from using informal protection decreases relatively to using formal protection.
Therefore, overall, our main result and its possible theoretical explanation appear to hold quantitatively when we replace the patent and secrecy dependent variables with the model broadly defined formal and informal protection variables.
5.3
The largest R&D investors are more likely to use secrecy than patents
Our second key result is that the coefficient for RDtop is statistically insignificant although positive for Patent in both bivariate and trivariate probit models. However, it is positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level for Secrecy using both models. The computed APE of RDtop on Patent and Secrecy confirms this result. Based on the trivariate probit model, the additional likelihood of using patents for firms being the top five percent in R&D expenditures to use patent is 3%, while it is 12% in the case of secrecy, which implies that top R&D active firms are four times more likely to use secrecy than patents. 8
If we believe that large R&D expenditures are positively correlated with large value innovations as assumed for instance by the model from Anton and Yao (2004) , this result provides support to one of the theoretical predictions of this paper that is: Firms with large sized innovations choose secrecy rather than patents due to the legal uncertainty associated with IP rights.
We note, however, that the evidence in the empirical literature is divided over this prediction. is considered to be of a large magnitude by comparison with an innovation "new for the firm".
On the other hand, Hall et al. (2012b) which also uses "innovation new to the market" as an independent variable measuring the novelty of an innovation in an univariate probit model for patents, finds the opposite result. The firms reporting "innovation new to the market" tend to use patents more than the firms reporting "innovation new to the firm". However, the authors do not estimate the model for secrecy, so it is not possible to compare the relative effects of innovation size on the use of patents versus the use of secrecy. Our measure of innovation size being different from the ones used in the above studies, our results are also not directly comparable.
Other determinants
We now briefly comment on other results, which are mostly consistent with the existing literature, in particular with Hall et al. (2012b) and Arundel (2001) . Excluding the Licensing and RDtop variables discussed above, the sign of the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance in Table 5 largely conforms to our expectations.
According to these estimates, we find that the effect of Product innovation is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, while the effect of Process innovation is positive but statistically insignificant on both Patent and Secrecy using the trivariate model. 9 . In order to investigate further the magnitude of these effects, we calculate the APE of Product and
Process innovation on the probability to use patent and secrecy. The results presented in Table 6 confirm that product innovators are more likely to use some protection and as likely to use patents as secrecy but also indicate that firms developing new processes are about seven times more likely to use secrecy than patents.
We also find that the likelihood of using patents increases with the size of a firm (measured by the number of employees) and with its income range. Larger firms are also more likely to use secrecy, which is consistent with the fact that larger firms are more likely to be multiproduct and to use several methods of protection including patents and secrecy. However, the likelihood of using secrecy between small and medium firms is statistically insignificant at any of the standard significance levels. Also, the Income variable has no effect on secrecy.
This suggests that, ceteris paribus, secrecy tends to be used by relatively smaller firms than patenting. Furthermore, the positive effect of Income on using patents tends to support the claim that the cost of the patent system is a barrier for firms with limited financial resources.
Further, consistent with Arundel (2001) , firms involved in joint R&D are more likely to use patents and firms sourcing their information internally and from non market institutions are more likely to use secrecy.
Finally, in line with all the empirical literature on patents, we find that patent users are more likely to be in manufacturing industries. In contrast, using secrecy and being in manufacturing industries is negatively related but this is not a statistically significant result.
Robustness check
This section addresses the sample selection issue arising from using the group of innovators as our sample for our previous analysis. The problem is that the innovator subsample may 9 However, the effect of Process innovation is significant at the 10% level in the bivariate model not be consistent with exogenous sample selection if the decision to use patents or secrecy is related to the antecedent decision to innovate. As shown by Heckman (1979) , in the case y * ji is observable, estimates of the coefficients β in Equation (5) from a non-random innovator subsample are biased. This implies that the two binary decisions of innovating and of choosing a method of protection need to be jointly studied.
To correct for this problem, we follow Van de Ven and van Praag (1981) and use a probit model with sample selection for patent and secrecy separately. We consider our latent variable of interest y * ji and a latent variable representing innovation activity denoted by y * Ii forming the following system of equations:
where the errors are bivariate normal with var(ε ji ) = 1, var(u Ii ) = 1 and cov(ε ji , u Ii ) = ρ j and j = p, s. Importantly, y ji is observed only when y Ii = 1. Thus there are three unconditional probabilities to take into account when computing the likelihood function:
P 11 = P rob(y ji = 1, y Ii = 1) P 01 = P rob(y ji = 0, y Ii = 1)
Note that the outcome P 10 = P rob(y ji = 1, y Ii = 0), which would be included in the standard bivariate probit model is not taken into account in this model. 10
In order to implement this model, we need to identify factors which affect innovation, but not patenting or secrecy, which can be used as instruments in the model. As noted previously, the IAB provides data on what drives a firm to innovate. In particular, three positive innovation driver variables have a significant effect on the innovation variable. These are "improve productivity" (BDRP), "increase revenue" (BDIR) and "be at the cutting edge of the industry" (BDCE). We interpret these variables as indicators of the firm's commitment to become a successful innovator and a technology leader, which should influence the innovation outcome.
10 Note that in reality about 25% of patent and secrecy users report no innovation between 2001-2003 in the IAB survey i.e. P10 = 0. This is easily explained by the fact that responding firms can report use of IP protection relating to innovations introduced before 2001. However, as a result of its specification, our bivariate probit model with sample selection merges outcomes P10 and P00. The test of pooling states proposed by Cramer and Ridder (1991) was used to examine whether combining these two outcomes leads to significantly different estimation results compared with the case where they are in separate states. The test statistic is too small to reject the null hypothesis at any conventional levels, indicating that our approach is acceptable in practice.
All the other regressors (except for Product and Process innovation) used in our primary models to explain patents (and secrecy) are included in both Equations (11) and (12), as they all have the potential to influence the decision to innovate. Table 8 reports the estimates of the two bivariate probit models with selection for patent and secrecy. The total sample after omitting the relevant missing values is 4,319 and the innovator sub-sample is 2,053. The ρ j estimates for the two models indicate similar and strong negative correlations between the residuals, and they are both statistically different from zero at the 1% level, which suggests some sample selection for both the patent and secrecy models. 11
The evidence shows that the self-selection does lead to some results being sensitive to the choice of sample. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for most variables decreases after controlling for the sample selection, however, they tend to retain the expected signs or level of significance. In particular, there is no statistically significant effect of Licensing on Patent (although its sign is negative) while this effect is statistically significant at the 5% level on Secrecy. Further, the firms with the top 5 percentile R&D expenditures are also more likely to use patents and secrecy but the result is statistically insignificant for patenting and statistically significant at the 10% level for secrecy. 12 Interestingly, we note that the coefficient for R&D is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the dependent variable Innovation, but it becomes negative and statistically significant for both the Patent and Secrecy variables. This implies that once taken into account that firms investing in R&D are significantly more likely to innovate, R&D is not a good predictor of choice of IP protection except for large R&D investors.
Another counterintuitive result is that collaborating in an R&D joint venture is not a strong determinant of being an innovator but it appears that firms engaged in this kind of cooperation are more likely to use both patents and secrecy. Overall, this additional analysis correcting for sample selection, confirms qualitatively our main results and also brings new insights. Of course, these models do not address the dependence between the patent and secrecy variables and the endogeneity issue presented by the Licensing variable and thus, can only complement but not replace our previous analysis.
11 In the case of patenting, the χ 2 test-statistic of the LR test is 4.34 with an associated p-value of 0.037, and it is 14.71 with a p-value of 0.0001 in the secrecy case.
12 Note that, combined with the strong negative correlation between the Innovation and Patent or Secrecy equations, this would suggest that the firms using IP protections are at the two ends of the spectrum in terms of their innovative capabilities: at one end, a relatively large proportion of IP users have probably very small innovations while at the other end, a few of them develop the largest innovations in the market. Note: Numbers reported in the bracket are standard errors; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Conclusion
This study explored firms' IPR protection strategies in relation with their involvement in knowledge trading proxied by their use of licensing agreements. The traditional belief is that patents are useful to construct licensing contracts and therefore it is expected that firms using licensing prefer patenting to secrecy. The recent model by Henry and Ponce (2011) predicts the opposite, the more knowledge is tradeable, the more firms use secrecy rather than patents because firms can reap the benefits from the non legal temporary monopoly arising from the tradeability of knowledge. Our results provide the first rigorous empirical support for this theory. Specifically, using an Australian data set, we find that firms which are engaged in licensing agreements are significantly more likely to use secrecy than patents.
In addition, our results show that the largest investors in R&D are more likely to use secrecy than patent, which is supported for instance by the theory of Anton and Yao (2004) . Other results are also consistent with the existing literature. In particular, large or manufacturing firms and those involved in R&D joint-ventures are more likely to use patents, while firms obtaining information from internal and non-market sources are more inclined to use secrecy.
This paper makes some additional contribution to the literature by using two novel econometric approaches to study the choice between patents versus secrecy. We developed a trivariate probit model to correct for the endogeneity of a dummy variable in a bivariate probit model.
We also applied a corrective method for sample selection to a probit model.
Furthermore, most studies, to this date, use data from large economies with atypical levels of innovation relying on very strong high-tech industries, such as the USA, Japan or the large European economies. Using a data set from Australia arguably presents the advantage to be more representative of the bulk of developed countries in terms of innovative capacity and output, so that perhaps we can learn more about the general international situation with regards to firms' IPR protection choices from the Australian context than from very large innovating countries. However we also acknowledge the limitations of this data set and we see at least two avenues for further research.
Firstly, using data at the innovation level that enables matching of an IPR protection method with a specific innovation and licensing contract would greatly enhance the analysis. However such data appears difficult to obtain. Alternatively, using firm-level data but analyzing separately the group of firms using both patents and secrecy from the users of only patents or secrecy may provide some further insights. Firms using both forms of protection are more likely to be multiproduct firms, while patent-only users, for instance, are more likely to have a single innovation and to make IP protection and licensing choices relating to that particular innovation. 13
Secondly, conducting the same analysis for different countries may also shed some new insights on these results. Australia is small open economy with a very large proportion of small firms (with less than twenty employees) and a relatively small manufacturing sector. 14 For these 13 Some kind of multinomial choice model would need to be specified to perform this type of analysis. 14 Based on the IAB, the share of manufacturing firms out of the total Australian firms population represents reasons, it is possible that the use of secrecy to protect IP, especially by small innovators, would be more prominent in Australia than in other larger developed economies, which would have the potential to skew our results in favour of secrecy over patent use. 15
Appendices
A.1 Note: Numbers reported in the bracket are standard errors; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
